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Abstract
Our research moves from three fundamental considerations that concern the mod-
elling and engineering of complex systems. First, organization, coordination and
security are strictly related issues that should be modelled in a uniform and coher-
ent framework. Second, models, technologies and methodologies should come hand
in hand, so that abstractions used in the analysis and design stages should be still
“alive and kicking” at development and execution time. Third, the general non-
formalisability of complex systems should not prevent us from using formal tools
whenever useful, such as in proving or ensuring properties of limited but meaningful
portions of a system.
By focussing on multi-agent systems, we discuss the notion of Agent Coordina-
tion Context (ACC) as an abstraction that (i) works as an organization and security
abstraction, (ii) integrates well with abstractions provided by coordination infras-
tructures, and (iii) covers the engineering process from design to deployment. In
particular, in this paper we study the syntax and semantics of a language for ACCs
speciﬁcation, exploiting typical process algebra techniques. Accordingly, we show
that process algebras are a suitable tool for both speciﬁcation and enactment of
security and coordination policies through ACCs.
1 Introduction
Coordination is one of the key issues in the modelling and engineering of
complex systems. As such, it has been the subject of several investigations
within a multiplicity of diﬀerent research areas, and, correspondingly, has
been diﬀerently conceived and deﬁned. However, coordination can quite gen-
erally be deﬁned as the management of interaction — interaction among the
components of a system, whichever the components, whichever the system.
According to this general acceptation, coordination comes hand in hand with
two other key issues in complex systems: security and organization.
c©2003 Published by Elsevier Science B. V.
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Security represents a dual aspect with respect to coordination: as discussed
in [11], coordination is in some sense the constructive counterpart of security
in the dynamics of interaction. That is, whereas security focuses on preventing
undesired / incorrect system behaviours, which may result in problems like de-
nial of services or unauthorised access to resources, coordination is concerned
with enabling desirable / correct system behaviours, typically the meaningful,
goal-directed interaction between diﬀerent system components. As a result,
not only would coordination and security beneﬁt by being modelled and ex-
pressed within a common conceptual framework, but it is also seemingly clear
that these two aspects cannot any longer be treated separately in the engi-
neering of complex systems — given that they both deal with handling the
dynamics of interaction within systems.
On the other hand, organization strictly relates to both security and coor-
dination. Apart from organization abstractions typically used in the security
ﬁeld (roles, in particular [26]), organization typically deals with static aspects
of interaction, while coordination (and security, dually) deals with dynam-
ics. Roughly speaking, the organization of a system (whether a human or an
artiﬁcial one) deﬁnes the admissible interactions among system components
at design-time, while coordination and security govern interaction at execu-
tion time. It comes then not as unexpected that organizational sciences have
provided powerful conceptual tools that eﬀectively interpret and frame the
role of coordination within complex systems of any sort: this is the case, in
particular, of Activity Theory, as discussed in [25].
Organization, coordination and security are typically modelled through
suitable design abstractions, such as roles, access lists, and coordination ab-
stractions — e.g. monitors. channels, tuple spaces. However, the needs of
today complex systems engineering call for “living abstractions” — that is,
abstractions coming along the whole engineering process, from design to de-
ployment — to support fundamental engineering practices like incremental de-
velopment, on-line veriﬁcation, corrective / adaptive / evolutive maintenance.
Also, suitable run-time abstractions are necessary to allow the full exploita-
tion of component intelligence for system monitoring and self-modiﬁcation
[23]. Systems should then be provided at run-time with the same abstractions
used for the system design — whether they are organization, coordination,
or security abstractions: this is in fact the role of infrastructures, that are
also the natural loci where to embody a uniform framework accounting for
organization, coordination and security altogether.
Infrastructures also represent an eﬀective approach to the general problem
of formalisability of complex systems, which may come either for pragmatical
or theoretical issues. However, this problem should not prevent us from look-
ing for formally provable properties of complex systems. Indeed, formal tools
— to specify, design, and verify — can and should be used to assess features of
limited portions of a system, provided they are meaningful but also formally
tractable — e.g. the absence of certain incorrect behaviours, or the occur-
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rence of required events. By their very nature, infrastructures intrinsically
encapsulate key portions of systems — often in charge of the critical system
behaviour. As a result, providing formally speciﬁed infrastructures, and in
particular formally deﬁned abstractions, strongly promotes the discovery and
proof of critical system properties. Most notably, a system property can be
assessed at design-time through the formal deﬁnition of some design abstrac-
tion. Then, by ensuring compliance of the corresponding run-time abstraction
provided by the infrastructure, this property can be enforced at execution time
and be automatically veriﬁed for any system based on the infrastructure.
Along the above lines, in this paper we focus on Multi-Agent Systems
(MAS) as a relevant class of complex systems. First, we discuss the notion of
Agent Coordination Context (ACC) [21] as a design abstraction provided at
execution time by an agent infrastructure, negotiated when an agent enters the
system and then governing its interaction. ACCs work as both organization
and security abstractions, covering the engineering process from design to
deployment. In particular, the ACC abstraction have been exploited in [23] to
develop an extension of the TuCSoN infrastructure for agent coordination [24]
towards security, showing how ACCs smoothly integrate with coordination
abstractions such as TuCSoN tuple centres.
In this paper, we elaborate on the potential of formal methods in MAS by
virtue of ACCs. We show how typical process algebra techniques can be used
to provide syntax and semantics to a language for specifying the behaviour
of ACCs, resembling Milner’s CCS [17]. This language can be used within
infrastructures supporting the notion of ACC for the speciﬁcation of security
and coordination policies based on a role-based organization model. Most
notably, our approach exploits process algebra techniques for the enactment
of such policies, that is, for their enforcement as run-time norms governing
the interaction of agents within MAS.
2 Agent Coordination Contexts
2.1 Framing Security in MAS Coordination and Organization
Security in Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) concerns a multiplicity of aspects
at diﬀerent levels of abstraction — from traditional issues such as authen-
tication and resource access control, up to higher level issues such as social
order, electronic institutions, and agents & law [10,19]. Agent autonomy and
system openness are among the main features that make the engineering of
security particularly challenging in the context of MAS. On the one hand,
models and infrastructures needs to prescriptively specify and enact social
norms and security policies, but without a direct and too tight control on the
behaviour of the individual agent, so as not hamper its autonomy. On the
other hand, MAS are typically characterised by a high degree of heterogeneity
and dynamism: norms and policies must be enforced in dynamic organization
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structures, where (heterogeneous) agents enter and leave the organization at
run-time. Moreover, complex scenarios call for models and infrastructures sup-
porting changes of the security strategies themselves, in order to dynamically
adapt to environment changes or new system goals.
The most eﬀective and expressive models for engineering security in com-
plex and articulated systems are today based on the notion of role — and
are indeed organizational models as well. These approaches are rooted in
the RBAC (role-based access control) model [26], which provides a suit-
able support for organizing and securing resource access in the context of
open/articulated environments, and improves traditional approaches based
e.g. on the discretionary access model (DAC). Organizational models based
on roles are nowadays widely adopted for agent-based software engineering
as well, mainly extending approaches rooted in object oriented software en-
gineering, providing means for the analysis and design of MAS [16,31]. The
deﬁnition of organization structures and rules makes it possible to statically
frame the agent interaction space, focusing on abstract structures such as roles,
societies or group structures [14]. To some extent, this represents the static
counterpart of coordination, in that coordination can be seen as a means to
complement the aims of organization structures, by promoting the dynamic
management of rules and norms at run-time.
In this general framework, it is clear that the multiple aspects related to
the security issue in MAS can be tackled in a coherent and satisfactory frame-
work only by covering the whole spectrum that ranges from organization —
with issues related to system structures and relations among the components
— to coordination — with issues related to collective processes. Facing secu-
rity modelling and engineering within this range increases system conceptual
integrity by promoting the reuse of abstractions such as roles, permissions,
and societies — which have already proved to be eﬀective in the context of
organization and coordination — in order to enforce complex and dynamic
security policies.
2.2 The ACC Design/Run-time Abstraction
The notion of Agent Coordination Context (ACC) has been introduced in [21]
so as to model issues concerning MAS organization in an integrated way with
coordination and security issues.
Generally speaking, an ACC is meant to represent the conceptual bound-
ary between the agent and the environment, encapsulating the agent interface
towards the environment. As an interface, the agent coordination context
both (i) works as a model for the agent environment, and (ii) enables and
rules the interactions between the agent and the environment. The ACC ab-
straction models the presence of an agent within an organization, by deﬁning
its admissible actions (including perception) with respect to organization re-
sources and its admissible communications toward the other agents belonging
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to the organization. Thus, an ACC works both as a speciﬁcation tool for the
rules governing agent interaction, and as a means to enact such rules — that
is, to physically let admissible agent actions towards the environment. More-
over, the ACC is meant to store such rules, and make them available for agent
run-time inspection and, possibly, meta-level reasoning over the MAS.
When exploited in the context of coordination infrastructures — like TuC-
SoN, as studied in [23] — an ACC works by governing agent interactions with
coordination media — like tuple centres —, expressed in terms of primitives
of the underlying coordination model — like ReSpecT [22]. In order to ac-
cess the coordination media provided by the infrastructure, an agent must
join a society by ﬁrst negotiating with the organization through the basic
services provided by the infrastructure. Typically, in this stage the agent
speciﬁes/describes the society that it aims at entering, and the role it aims
at playing inside the society. In the case of a successful negotiation — i.e.
the agent request is compatible with the rules deﬁned inside the organization
—, the agent is provided with an ACC with a speciﬁc conﬁguration, which it
enters. From then on, the agent is an active part of the society, and can access
and use the coordination media spread to the diﬀerent nodes, according to the
organizational rules deﬁned in the ACC. More on this can be found in [23].
2.3 Modelling and Enacting Security Policies
Security issues in MAS can be modelled and enacted by means of the ACC
(i) negotiation and (ii) run-time stages.
The ACC negotiation stage models an agent entering an organization, and
there assuming some speciﬁc role, according to the RBAC framework. The
inter-role and agent-role relationships deﬁned by the speciﬁc organization node
entered by an agent represent the security policies ruling ACC negotiation.
Such policies determine whether an agent can join the society, based on the
agent identity — authentication is typically requested here — and on the
roles that the agent is possibly already playing within the organization. This
enables the enforcement of basic security principles concerning (static and
dynamic) separation of duties [27].
On the other hand, the ACC run-time stage makes it possible to govern at
execution time agent communication and access to the organization resources,
according to the permissions granted to the agent role(s). Such permissions
are expressed in terms of the set of the (sequences of) actions that an agent
is allowed (or forbidden) to perform within the organization. For instance, in
the very case of coordinated systems that we here focus on, permissions are
expressed in terms of admissible coordination primitives on the coordination
media provided by the infrastructure.
Both ACC negotiation and run-time stages deal with crucial security issues.
However, in this paper we focus on aspects related to the ACC run-time stage,
which include the policies by which an ACC controls, constraints, ﬁlters — in
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one word, secures — the agent interaction within the organization. Indeed,
these aspects are concerned with the dynamics issues typically raising from
the relationship between security and coordination, whereas the negotiation
phase — dealing with roles and their interplay — is mostly concerned with
static security aspects of the organization, such as authentication.
Admissible agent actions are not deﬁned statically, in general, but may
dynamically depend on a number of factors such as agent interaction history,
time constraints, general system status and behaviour, and many others. For
instance, the capability of specifying the set of admissible actions by virtue of
the action history can be used to bound agent behaviour to some given inter-
action protocol, deﬁned according to the agent role. A well-known example
in the MAS context is the Contract Net Protocol [28]: through suitably con-
ﬁgured ACCs it is possible to constraint the interactive behaviour of agents
to follow any of the possible action sequences established for the auctioneer
and bidder roles involved in the protocol. This capability is nearly mandatory
for MAS models and infrastructures, especially in those contexts where the
enforcement of interaction protocols and social norms is strictly required, such
as in electronic institution contexts.
3 A Language for Agent Coordination Contexts
In this section, a formal foundation for the notion of ACC is given, focussing
on its application to coordination infrastructures in the context of MAS, where
ACCs rule the interactions between agents and coordination media. Our
framework intentionally abstracts away from the details of the speciﬁc co-
ordination model supported by the infrastructure, so as to be general enough
to support ACC application to many diﬀerent coordination models and in-
frastructures — not only TuCSoN [23].
Starting from a general framework for coordination infrastructures, we
study its extension taking into account ACCs. The basic framework views co-
ordinated systems as made of agents and coordination media, evolving as coor-
dination primitives are executed by an agent towards a coordination medium.
The model accounts for both synchronisation — related to the dynamics of
actions — and communication aspects — related to value-passing. ACCs are
modelled as abstractions ruling/ﬁltering/controlling each agent interaction.
Several options were available for a language for describing an ACC secu-
rity policy. Our choice was not to invent a new language, but rather to exploit
the well-known syntax and semantics of existing concurrent languages (namely
CCS [17] and ACP [1]) by adapting them to the ACC expressive needs. Most
notably, process algebras techniques are here applied not only to traditional
contexts such as speciﬁcation and veriﬁcation, but also for enactment : the
security policies of an ACC are meant to be enforced at run-time by the MAS
infrastructure, stored in the ACC run-time, and explicitly represented through
the language deﬁned in the following.
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3.1 Synchronisation and Communication in Coordination Models
A general viewpoint on coordination is to see coordinated systems as pop-
ulated by coordination media and agents interacting with each other [7,30].
The dynamics of these abstractions can be characterised in terms of a transi-
tion system where actions are successful executions of coordination primitives,
performed by the agents towards the coordination media. Correspondingly, a
system evolution can be naturally represented by coupling agent and media
interactions, accounting for both synchronisation and communication aspects.
Synchronisation
Let metavariables a, b and c range over the set of coordination primitives A,
here also called actions ; M and N over the setM of states for a coordination
media; P and Q over the set P of agent states. As usual, M and P may
not represent the entire state of coordination media and agents, which are
typically too complex to be usefully represented, but only the part of their
state that aﬀects the coordination aspects of the system. Then, the interactive
behaviour of coordination media and agents is amenable to a description by
transition systems 〈M,−→M, A〉 and 〈P,−→P, A〉, where, following the standard
conventions, the two transition relations are of the kind −→M⊆ M× A ×M
and −→P⊆ P × A× P. In a synchronous setting — which is here assumed for
simplicity, but with no loss of generality —, any coordinated system evolution
is characterised by an agent executing a transition P
a−→P Q and a medium
concurrently executing transition M
a−→M N , representing the fact that the
invocation of primitive a by P is accepted/allowed/processed by the medium
M .
This traditional model (see others similar in [30] and [9]) is indeed rather
“synchronisation-oriented”. In its basic form, it does not support any form
of value-passing from the medium to the agent and viceversa, which is indeed
a crucial aspect of service-oriented viewpoints over coordination [30], and of
foundations of interaction in general — see e.g. value-passing in CCS. As a
result, since our interest here is to devise an eﬀective language for expressing
ACCs behaviours, we now elaborate on tackling this issue.
Communication
There are various mechanisms by which existing coordination models deal
with value-passing issues, which, from the agent viewpoint, are basically char-
acterised by some variable substitution technique. Examples are standard
α-renaming when the coordination media is a CCS-like channel, the pattern
matching mechanism in Linda [15], term uniﬁcation in logic-based models
such as ReSpecT tuple centres [22], enhanced matching in [5], and so on. In
this paper, we found crucial to cope with value-passing in a general way.
This issue is tackled by a mathematical structure we call substitution sys-
tem, which is a set Σ ⊆ A → A of partial functions representing allowed
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substitutions from actions to actions, which is required to be closed under
function composition and to include all the identity functions over subsets of
A 1 . Given Σ we denote by A⊆ A× A the relation deﬁned as:
a A b ⇔ ∃σ ∈ Σ s .t . b = σ(a)
which is used to introduce a generality relation over actions, and can be shown
to be a preorder by the deﬁnition of Σ. Correspondingly, we deﬁne also
Σ⊆ Σ× Σ as the preorder relation over substitutions that preserves A:
σ Σ σ′ ⇔ ∀a, σ(a) A σ′(a)
A general substitution function γ ∈ (A) → Σ is also deﬁned that associates
to a couple a, b with a A b a minimal substitution γ(a, b) mapping a to b,
that is: so that (i) γ(a, b)(a) = b; and (ii) ∀σ ∈ Σ so that b = σ(a), the
relation σ Σ γ(a, b) holds, i.e., σ is not smaller than γ(a, b). Notice that in
those cases where no least substitution from a to b exists, we suppose that γ
simply chooses a minimal one. Also, γ can be partial, as no substitution may
actually exist that maps a onto b, in which case the notation γ(a, b) does not
make sense.
A substitution system is exploited here to give an atomic representation
of those interactions between an agent and a coordination medium that in-
volve the request for a value and the corresponding reply. In particular, a
coordination medium is now given a representation by a transition system
〈M,−→M, A × Σ〉, where (M,a, σ,N) ∈−→M is written M a:σ−→M N and means
that action a can be executed that causes action substitution σ in the request-
ing agent. A label a : σI ∈ A× Σ, where σI is an identity function, is simply
denoted by a.
As a simple example, we consider the communication style induced by
Linda’s pattern matching. The Linda coordination primitives deﬁne the set
of actions AL ::= π(id , t(e1, . . . , en)) where π is a primitive name — either
out, rd, or in —, t is a tuple name, and terms ei are either variables or
constants. Valid substitutions are all the functions from actions to actions
that substitute variables to terms. For instance, an agent requesting the re-
moval of any tuple of the kind t(1, X) in tuple space id is modelled by action
in(id , t(1, X)), the tuple space replying tuple t(1, 2) is modelled by the substi-
tution γ(in(id , t(1, X)), in(id , t(1, 2))), which is the most general substitution
of actions in which X is mapped to 2 — denoted e.g. by {X/2} in π-calculus.
Notice that diﬀerent communication mechanisms can be represented as
specialisations of the substitution system. For instance, value-passing such
as α-renaming, logic uniﬁcation, and even models without any substitutions
1 More precisely, a substitution system should be deﬁned as a category whose objects are
subsets of actions. However, for the sake of simplicity, any relationship to category theory
is here not studied further, which may be the subject of future work.
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mechanism as in [7] can be simply represented, using slight variations of the
Linda pattern matching schema described above.
Notice, that since this paper focusses on access control, other security issues
such as secrecy are intentionally neglected by this substitution mechanism.
However, it is worth noting that this problem, which may be the subject of
our future studies, may be formally addressed by a proper substitution system
explicitly considering encryption and decryption of data.
The Execution of Coordination Primitives
To understand this substitution mechanism and its coupling with synchronous
interaction, agents can be easily — and without loss of generality — be under-
stood as non-deterministic, sequential processes executing coordination primi-
tives in the set A, each possibly involving a substitution in Σ. Correspondingly,
the set P is deﬁned by the CCS-like syntax:
P ::= 0 | a.P | P +Q
with the congruence rules:
P + 0 ≡ P P +Q ≡ Q+ P P + (Q+ P ′) ≡ (P +Q) + P ′
As usual, operator . is used for preﬁx operations and + for nondetermin-
istic choice. The set P can be equipped by a transition system semantics
〈P,−→P, A× Σ〉 analogously to coordination media, where relation −→P is de-
ﬁned by the rules:
a.P
a:σ−→P σP
P
a:σ−→P P ′
P +Q
a:σ−→P P ′
where σP denotes substitution σ applied to process P , deﬁned as:
σ0 ≡ 0 σa.P ≡ σ(a).σP σ(P +Q) ≡ σP + σQ
Finally, coordinated system conﬁgurations can be modelled as elements
Sp ∈ SP deﬁned by the syntax:
Sp ::= 0 |M | P | (Sp ||Sp)
that is, as a multiset of agents and coordination media. The dynamics of such
conﬁgurations can be expressed by a transition system 〈SP ,−→ρ〉, where the
transition relation −→ρ⊆ SP × SP (without labels) is expressed by the rule:
P
a:σ−→P Q M a:σ−→M N
P ||M ||Sp −→ρ Q ||N ||Sp
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In this model, a system conﬁguration evolves as an action is synchronously
executed by both an agent and a coordination medium involving a substitu-
tion. However, given the structure of agents provided above — where agents
are subject to a substitution rather than imposing it —, this model endorses
the viewpoint of agents executing actions and coordination media accepting
them by imposing a substitution.
As a simple example consider the agent modelled by the process
in(id , t(1, Y )).out(id , t(1, Y )).0, which wants to remove and then insert
again a tuple of the kind t(1, Y ). If the ﬁrst primitive causes the re-
moval of tuple t(1, 2) — that is, its action is coupled with the substitu-
tion γ(in(id , t(1, Y )), in(id , t(1, 2))) — then the agent state will move to
out(id , t(1, 2)).0 as an eﬀect of the substitution on its continuation. By this
model, the above process speciﬁcation guarantees that a removed tuple is
subsequently inserted again.
We claim that the framework presented here, featuring coordination media
interactions and value-passing by the substitution system, is quite general and
applicable to a number of existing models. Other than the generality of our
substitution system, modelling a coordinated system in terms of agents and
coordination media interacting with each other is currently the most stan-
dard approach, applied in [30,20,7,3] to either data-driven and control-driven
coordination models.
3.2 A Framework for ACC
In the framework developed so far, the interaction between an agent and a
coordination medium is direct: when an agent intends to execute an action and
this can be handled by a coordination medium, the action is simply performed.
This assumption represents the idea that all the burden for controlling and
ruling agent interactions is to be charged upon the coordination media. In this
section we add the notion of ACC to this basic framework, where the ACC is
viewed as an abstraction wrapping the agent and ruling its interactions with
the environment — here represented by the coordination media. In particular,
we provide a means to specify and enact security policies via ACCs.
The ACC Algebra
Instead of deﬁning a brand-new language for ACC speciﬁcation, we here rely
on standard language features typically exploited in concurrency theory to
describe interactive behaviours, namely in process algebras such as CCS and
ACP. This not only opens to the possibility of devising methodologies for the
veriﬁcation of properties, but generally allows us to inherit the conceptual
framework for these algebras, facilitating the task of reasoning about coordi-
nation and security properties. Most notably, we take advantage of the fact
that the operational semantics of process algebras can be directly interpreted
as the interactive behaviour of a software component.
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In particular, our idea is to make an ACC speciﬁcation be operational, i.e.,
coinciding with the representation of the ACC state itself, which evolves as
interactions occur. We let metavariables C and D range over the set C of
states for an ACC, which are here called contexts, deﬁned by the algebra with
syntax:
C ::= 0 | a | C +D | (C ||D) | C;D | D
0 is the terminated context, a is the context allowing the execution of action
a, operator + is used for non-deterministic choice, || is parallel composition,
; is sequential composition, and D ∈ Def is the name of a deﬁnition of the
kind D := C that should come with the context speciﬁcation (analogously
e.g. to the agent deﬁnition operator in CCS). Whereas the context a can be
considered as the context executing action a on the coordination media, it can
(and should) be dually considered also as the context allowing its associated
agent to execute action a. Contexts are considered up to the congruence
relation ≡ deﬁned by rules:
0 + C ≡ C C +D ≡ D + C (C +D) + C ′ ≡ C + (D + C ′)
0 ||C ≡ C C ||D ≡ D ||C (C ||D) ||C ′ ≡ C || (D ||C ′)
0;C ≡ C C; 0 ≡ C C; (D;C ′) ≡ (C;D);C ′
As for agents, such a congruence relation is to be completed with the rules for
dealing with substitution:
σ0 ≡ 0 σa ≡ σ(a) σ(C +D) ≡ σC + σD
σ(C ||D) ≡ σC ||σD σ(C;D) ≡ σC;σD σD ≡ D
Notice that a contex name D is immune from substitutions, and moreover, we
avoid the usual congruence rule D ≡ C (when D := C): the reason for these
choices will be clariﬁed in the examples of next section.
Similarly to agents, a context evolves as actions are executed (by the agent
over some medium) and its continuation is aﬀected by the corresponding sub-
stitution, hence can be modelled by a transition system 〈C,−→C, A×Σ〉, where
−→C is deﬁned by the rules:
a
a:σ−→C 0
D := C C
a:σ−→C D
D
a:σ−→C D
C
a:σ−→C C ′
C;D
a:σ−→C C ′;σD
C
a:σ−→C C ′
C ||D a:σ−→C C ′ ||D
C
a:σ−→C C ′
C +D
a:σ−→C C ′
In particular, a deﬁnition name D behaves as the associated context, substi-
27
Omicini, Ricci & Viroli
tutions are propagated to the sequential continuation, while choice and com-
position are managed as usual in process algebras. Notice that this calculus
for contexts degenerates to a fragment of CCS when the substitution system
is the naive one including only the identity substitution. In this new setting,
a system conﬁguration has the syntax:
S ::= 0 | 〈P,C〉 |M | (S ||S)
that is, is a multiset of coordination media and of couples 〈P,C〉 formed
by an agent state P and the state of its ACC C. The dynamics of system
conﬁgurations is deﬁned by the transition system 〈S,−→S〉 with the rules:
P
a:σ◦γ(a,b)−−−−−→P Q C b:σ−→C D M b:σ−→M N
〈P,C〉 ||M ||S −→S 〈Q,D〉 ||N ||S
P
a:σ−→P Q C b:σ◦γ(b,a)−−−−−→C D M a:σ−→M N
〈P,C〉 ||M ||S −→S 〈Q,D〉 ||N ||S
where binary operator ◦ for substitutions is usual function composition. The
ﬁrst rule means that, for an agent in state P to move to state Q by action
a, its context must allow an action b for which a general substitution γ(a, b)
is deﬁned — namely, a is more general according to A. If this is the case,
b is actually executed by the context on a coordination medium, and the
corresponding substitution σ is propagated to the agent by composing it to
γ(a, b). Dually, the second rule means that P may execute a if the context
allow a more general action b, in which case a is executed on the coordination
medium, and the corresponding substitution σ is propagated to the context
by composing it to γ(b, a). 2
The whole speciﬁcation can be completed by adding rules for agents enter-
ing and leaving the system, and negotiating the acquisition of a context, but
this is left out from this paper for the sake of simplicity. Instead, the model
provided so far allows us to reason about the fact that a context imposes a
hard constraint on an agent behaviour, as discussed in the following.
A number of interesting features are left out from this speciﬁcation, which
are indeed likely to become the subject of future research, including: timing
properties, speciﬁcation of prohibited actions (instead of the allowed ones
only), and an alpha-renaming mechanism for deﬁnitions.
2 The simmetry between these two rules could be tackled by a diﬀerent substitution mech-
anism handling substitutions in a symmetric way, thus leading to only one unifying rule.
However, we believe that the formulation above more clearly shows how substitutions could
be handled in the two cases.
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Properties
The basic property of our model of ACCs is that the set of admissible be-
haviours resulting from the composition of an ACC and an agent is smaller
than the set of behaviours admitted by the ACC itself, and similarly, it is also
smaller than the set of behaviours admitted by the process itself. As a result,
since the ACC can be seen as added to the usual case where the agent directly
interacts with the coordination media, the ACC can be interpreted as acting
as a constrainer for the agent, enabling only a predeﬁned subset of behaviours.
More precisely, consider trace semantics as the observation semantics for
our labelled transition systems [29], which uses the multiset of all the admissi-
ble histories of actions as a system’s observable behaviour. Let P be an agent
state, C be its initial context, and SM be the coordination space of the system,
namely, the set of all coordination media populating the system. Let βPCS be
the observable behaviour of the agent when interacting with the context, βCPS
the observable behaviour of the context when controlling the agent, βPS the
observable behaviour of the agent when directly interacting with coordination
media, and βCS the observable behaviour of the context when interacting with
coordination media by itself (or equivalently, controlling an agent willing to
execute any action).
To reason about the relationship between these behaviours, we extend the
notion of process reﬁnement as traditionally deﬁned for process algebras [29]:
according to trace semantics, the behaviour of a process P is a particular case
of another Q — i.e. P a reﬁnement of Q — when P ’s histories are included
into Q’s. We denote by β τ β′ when the behaviour β is a trace-reﬁnement
of β′. We also denote by β Σ β′ when the behaviour β is equivalent to β′
modulo substitution, when either
∀〈. . . , ai : σi, . . .〉 ∈ β,∃〈. . . , a′i : σ′i, . . .〉 ∈ β′ s .t . ∀i, σi(ai) = σ′i(a′i)
or
∀〈. . . , a′i : σ′i, . . .〉 ∈ β′,∃〈. . . , ai : σi, . . .〉 ∈ β s .t . ∀i, σi(ai) = σ′i(a′i)
The main property of our formal framework is expressed by the following
diagram:
βPCM
τ←−−− βPM
Σ
∥
∥
∥
βCPM
τ←−−− βCM
where arrows go from a behaviour to a reﬁnement of it. The upper arrow
means that any context acts as a constrainer to the interactive behaviour of
an agent, this sub-property being here referred to as soundness, that is, no
new behaviour is added by adding a context. The lower arrow means that
the behaviour obtained by using a context along with an agent is always a
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reﬁnement of that of the context by itself, which we here refer to as security :
after the behaviour of a context is declared as secure, the eﬀects of an agent
on the coordination media is automatically secured. The left equivalence
means that when coupling an agent and a context, the context’s behaviour
is equivalent (modulo substitution) to the process’ one, this property referred
to as preservation: when an agent performs an action allowed by the context,
then the agent is ensured that this (and only this) is actual performed on the
coordination medium as well. The proof of these properties is a simple, direct
consequence of the structure of transition relation −→S (and the equivalent ones
where only agents and contexts are respectively taken into account). Notice
that in the case the framework sticks to the version without value-passing,
that is, when the substitution system only includes the identities, the left
arrow becomes the equality relation.
In an open scenario, where at design-time almost nothing about an agent
internal architecture is known — and hence, little is known about its actual
interactive behavior —, the management of ACCs ensures two diﬀerent, yet
related beneﬁts. On the one hand, agent interactions with the coordination
media can be conﬁned to only those behaviors that are secure according to the
ACC policy. On the other hand, this model simpliﬁes reasoning about system
behaviour: in open systems, there is no need to worry about which behaviour
will be manifested by upcoming unknown agents, given that one can safely
stick to the ACC — the actual agent behaviour being a particular case of it.
In particular, this framework shows the potential for extending reasoning and
automatic veriﬁcation of properties from closed to open scenarios.
4 Examples
In the scenario depicted in this paper, whenever an agent is willing to enter an
open system to exploit its resources, it ﬁrst has to negotiate an ACC, which
will then control and secure the agent access. Despite explicit details on this
negotiation are not provided here, in open scenarios this is likely to include
the agent inspecting a speciﬁcation of the behaviour of the ACC of interest.
So, the syntax and semantics for contexts described in previous section are
not only a means to describe the behaviour of contexts, but they can also be
seen as the deﬁnition of a language for security properties — to be exploited
at design-time to devise out resource access policies, and at run-time to enact
security policies, and to make them explicitly available to agents for inspection.
In this section we show that this language is simple, yet powerful enough to
describe a number of security policies going beyond the naive idea of enabling
a subset of actions, but also enabling speciﬁc protocols, enforcing concurrency
policies, tuning the amount of resources that can be accessed, and allowing
the ACC to dynamically control accesses. Clearly, to gain this expressiveness,
the language features borrowed from deeply studied foundational calculi for
interaction — such as CCS and ACP — play a crucial role.
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Filtering
The basic security policy that our language for contexts should be able to
specify is the ability of discerning which invocation of coordination primitives
is admissible and which is not, namely, what actions an agent is allowed to
execute. Notice that this is the typical approach to security of systems based
on access control lists (ACL): once an agent has been authenticated — in our
framework, once it has successfully negotiated an ACC — it can only access
a subset of the available resources. A general deﬁnition of the kind
D := (a1 + a2 + . . .+ an);D
implements the idea: the context expressed by D can undeﬁnitely execute any
action ai, whereas others are not allowed. Hence, the choice operator + is
used to enable a subset of actions, while sequential composition along with
the recursive deﬁnition D is used to iterate this behaviour indeﬁnitely. In fact,
any sequence of the actions a1, . . . , an is an allowed history of the context D.
In particular, this holds when not considering substitutions. On the other
hand, substitutions allow us to ﬁlter the allowed actions more ﬂexibly. In the
Linda case, for instance, we can deﬁne
D := (out(id , t(X, 1)) + in(id , t(X, 1)) + rd(id , t(X, 1)));D
which means that only tuples of the kind t(X, 1) can actually be inserted,
read, and removed from the tuple space id . This example also shows why we
make the substitution operator not aﬀecting deﬁnitions: otherwise, inserting
tuple t(1, 1) would have caused the substitution of X with 1 from then on,
prohibiting to later insert e.g. tuple t(2, 1).
Protocols
The mechanisms of ACLs is indeed a static one: the subset of allowed actions is
decided after authentication, and is typically not changed thereafter. Instead,
our language is suﬃciently powerful to enable the idea of protocol, that is, to
impose in which sequence an agent can perform given actions. For instance,
by the context D deﬁned by
D := (a1 + a2); (a3 + a4); a5
the agent is allowed to execute only three actions, the former being a1 or a2,
the second a3 or a4, the latter a5. In general, by the operators + and ; a
context can specify any ﬁnite subsequence of actions as being allowed, such
as e.g.
D := (a1 + a2; a3) + a1; a1; (a2 + a3)
and so on. This mechanism can be fruitfully exploited along with recursive
deﬁnitions and substitutions, as in the following Linda case:
D ::= in(id , t(X, 1)); out(id , t(X, 1));D
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The context D not only speciﬁes that the agent should alternatively con-
sume and write tuples of the kind t(X, 1), but by means of the substitu-
tion mechanism it forces the agent to insert the same tuple just after its
removal. For instance, one can easily verify that while the sequence of ac-
tions 〈in(id , t(1, 1)), out(id , t(1, 1)), in(id , t(2, 1)), out(id , t(2, 1))〉 is allowed
by the context, 〈in(id , t(1, 1)), out(id , t(2, 1))〉 is not. This kind of speciﬁca-
tion is particularly relevant when the occurrence of a tuple in the shared space
means that a resources is available: using such a protocol would ensure that
agents release the resource(s) used before accessing others.
Fine-Grained Policies
Besides basic mechanisms for ﬁltering admissible actions and enforcing proto-
cols, our language makes it possible a ﬁner-grained tuning of the access policy
to the coordination media.
As a ﬁrst example, suppose that invoking an action is used for representing
an access to a resource. In this case, it may be sensible to limit the amount of
actions that an agent wants to execute: the composition operator || can be
exploited to this end. By the context D deﬁned as
D ::= a1 || a1 || a1 || a2 || a3
an agent can invoke a1 at most three times, a2 and a3 only once, in whichever
order.
When this mechanism is used along with protocols, it can be exploited to
allow an agent to participate in more simultaneous conversations of the same
protocol. The Linda example shown above can be extended as
D ::= (in(id , t(X, 1)); out(id , t(X, 1))) ||D
allowing the agent to exploit resources simultaneously. In this case, even
though the agent is not required to release a resource before using another, it
still cannot insert tuples that it had not removed, which at least ensures the
safety of the coordination medium.
Dynamic controls and non-determinism
An interesting subtlety comes in when interpreting the meaning of the choice
operator in contexts. Consider a context of the kind a1;C1+ . . .+an;Cn, with
all ai distinct from each other. This context allows the agent to execute any
action ai, and correspondingly, the context continuation Ci carries on. As a
result, in this case the agent makes a deterministic choice through the context.
On the other hand, the situation is diﬀerent when the ai are not all dis-
tinct. By a context of the kind a;C + a;D, after executing the action a the
context may be either move to state C or D, independently from the inter-
action with the agent. An interesting interpretation of this case is that by a
non-deterministic choice the infrastructure is able to dynamically control the
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shape and behaviour of an ACC during its run-time. In a sense, the secu-
rity policy of an ACC is not completely determined once and for all after the
negotiation, but can be subsequently inﬂuenced by the coordination infras-
tructures depending on run-time aspects such as the availability of resources.
As an example, consider the generic deﬁnition:
D ::= (start.resource(r) + start.resource(s));D
each time the agent wants to access a resource, it ﬁrst executes the initialising
action start, then the infrastructure through the ACC decides which resource
between r and s is to be made available to the agent, and correspondingly
drives the choice. Another interesting case is related to the Linda protocol
mentioned above. This variation of it:
D ::= in(id , t(X, 1)); out(id , t(X, 1)) + in(id , t(X, 1)); out(id , t(X, 1));D
makes it possible for the infrastructure to decide that a given ACC is to be
ﬁnished. In fact, at the time the tuple is removed by the invocation of primitive
in, the context may either choose to make it be the latter (left choice), or to
allow new ones thereafter (right choice).
5 Related Works and Conclusions
In this paper, we show that in complex systems — such as open, distributed,
and multi-agent systems (MAS) — a reasonable approach to tackle the many
aspects of security is to reason about organizational aspects of coordinated
systems. The notion of Agent Coordination Context (ACC) ﬁrstly introduced
in [21] has been discussed to capture both the idea of structural, static secu-
rity aspects (by means of ACC negotiation) and that of dynamic control of
interactions (by means of ACC run-time). In particular, in this paper we dis-
cussed a formal framework for reasoning about the ACC behaviour, exploiting
standard process algebra techniques to deﬁne a new language for specifying
and enacting security policies in MAS.
While our approach sees access control in terms of security policies that
may be dynamically established and enforced at run-time, other approaches
only stick to their static, design-time aspects. An example is the work in [12],
later evolved into the KLAIM model [13], where agents are given a type much
in the same way as in typed programming languages. This type system is
meant to characterise a mobile agent intention to access Linda tuple spaces
residing on diﬀerent localities, then supporting compile-time veriﬁcation of
soundness — i.e., safe access to resources. The Secure Object Space model
in [6] is based on the idea of associating a symmetric of asymmetric key to
any item of the shared dataspace (tuples or objects), by which an agent may
be allowed or not to access such items. SecSpaces [8] develops this idea by
including also logical partition of shared tuple spaces as a means to control
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access, also discriminating between primitives for tuple reading and removal.
With respect to existing proposals, the ACC approach, by moving security
out of the scope of the coordination model towards organization, allows for
tackling security issues in a uniform way within diﬀerent coordination models,
without requiring their extension.
Closer to our spirit is the work on Law-Governed Linda [18], featuring
controllers attached to each process, mediating communications by enforcing
a law. In spite of the similarities, the ACC model improves and generalises
this approach in a number of ways. First of all, as discussed in Section 2.1,
ACCs are grounded on the RBAC model, hence they enforce laws based on the
role the agent is dynamically requesting, and can be controlled and adapted at
run-time by the infrastructure. On the other hand, the (single) rule enforced in
Law-Governed Linda is statically devised simply as “the law of the distributed
system”, with neither an explicit notion of role nor dynamic adaptation. Then,
instead of introducing a new, ad-hoc language for enforcing a behaviour as
in [15], ACCs are amenable to a speciﬁcation in terms of a general process
algebra, which not only acts as a tool supporting expressiveness and power,
but also enables, in principle, formal veriﬁcation of properties.
In general, the application of the notion of ACC (along with the language
introduced here) to the design, deployment, and design-/run-time veriﬁcation
of complex open and distributed systems is the main line of development of
this research. From the security viewpoint, it would be interesting to evaluate
the applicability and the impact of the ACC notion not only on access control,
but also on authentication and secrecy.
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